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China and Southeast Asia:

Unbalanced Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion
By Xiangming Chen & Curtis Stone
Integrating with Southeast Asia is a key component of
China’s multi-pronged regionalisation around its borders as
its global rise continues. Below, Xiangming Chen and Curtis
Stone consider the ambition of China’s ‘Go Southwest’
strategy to extend its economic interests and influence into
Southeast Asia, and explore how China’s regional assertion
reinforces the larger trend of new spatial configurations in
light of increasing globalisation. The authors show how
simultaneous globalisation and regionalisation unleashes
a dual process of de-bordering and re-bordering where the
traditional barrier role of borders is yielding more to that
of bridges, as small, marginal, and remote border cities and
towns become larger centers of trade and tourism. This
article examines China’s effort to engage Southeast Asia
and many of China’s footprints within and beyond the cities
of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Inter-country and
intra-regional trade provides the starting point for examining the extent of economic integration in the GMS, and also
its unbalanced development.

Going Southwest
In a coffee shop in central Vientiane on a hot summer day
in 2012, two young Chinese businessmen from northwestern
China, sipping ice-cold Latte, talked about the prospect of
a new venture to explore copper in the mountains of northern Laos: ‘If we make $100 and they [Laotians] get $5, they
should be happy’. On the outskirts of Yunnan’s capital city
of Kunming, China’s fourth largest airport behind Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou (also the world’s fifth largest
airport in occupied area), Changshui International Airport,
which is expected to have flown 38 million passengers by
2020 and 65 million by 2040,1 was opened with much
fanfare in June 2012. While seemingly disparate, this pair of
anecdotes reveals the ambition of China’s ‘Go Southwest’
strategy to extend its economic interests and influence into
Southeast Asia.
Integrating with Southeast Asia is a key component of
China’s multi-pronged regionalisation around its borders
as its global rise continues.2 China’s regional assertion reinforces a larger trend of new spatial configuration as an inherent part of increasing globalisation driven by China. This
simultaneous globalisation and regionalisation unleashes
a dual process of de-bordering and re-bordering where the
traditional barrier role of borders is yielding more to that
of bridges.3 As a result, once small, marginal, and remote
border cities and towns have become larger and lively centers
of trade, tourism, and other flows. China’s effort to engage

Southeast Asia leaves many striking footprints within and
beyond the cities of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
facilitated Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), which
was launched in 1992 and consists of China’s Yunnan
Province (with the later addition of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand,
and Vietnam.

Trade with the GMS Countries
Inter-country and intra-regional trade provides the starting point for examining the extent of economic integration
in the GMS as well as its unbalanced development. China's
trade with each of the GMS countries has grown since 1990,
most rapidly since 2000 (see Figure1, next page). Given the
size of their economies, Thailand, followed by Vietnam, led
the smaller GMS countries in trade with China. However,
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Despite the overall growth of China-Southeast Asia trade,
China exerts a disproportionately strong influence on the
GMS through a Yunnan-based and regionally oriented policy.
the total volume of China-Myanmar
trade rose by $5.9 billion from 2001 to
2011, while China-Laos trade increased
by $1.2 billion (Figure 1). Much of
China’s growing trade with Myanmar
and Laos occurred through cooperation
across international boundaries. The
role of Yunnan and its capital city of
Kunming in China-GMS trade cannot
be understated.
Yunnan's GDP skyrocketed from $33
billion in 2000 to $160 billion in 2012,
and the province aims to double that to
$320 billion by 2017 through even stronger cross-border economic and trade
ties.4 Kunming acts as the origin and
core of economic activities that reach
into the bordering countries of Laos,
Myanmar, Vietnam, and beyond.

Unequal Power and Unbalanced Development
Despite the overall growth of ChinaSoutheast Asia trade, China exerts a
disproportionately strong influence on
the GMS through a Yunnan-based and
regionally oriented policy that projects development consequences over
the borders.
On May 6, 2011, China’s State
Council issued the important document
entitled ‘Supporting the Accelerated
Construction of Yunnan as the
Important Outpost for the Southwest
Region’, which tasked the capital city
of Kunming to become the international
hub for China’s southwestern region
facing the GMS. Symbolically, Yunnan’s
tallest building is rising in Kunming’s

Figure 1. China’s Trade with Five GMS Countries, 1990-2011
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Panlong District, which will serve as the
financial and commercial zone for the
local presence and regional expansion
of multinational companies.
In implementing the ‘Kunming as an
International Outpost’ strategy, Yunnan
provincial and Kunming municipal governments have introduced a variety of
policies and projects. First, they are
building a central Yunnan regional
economic circle knitted together by
the four cities of Kunming, Qujing,
Yuxi, and Chuxiong with Kunming as
the core (see Map 1).5 In May 2012,
Yunnan approved the establishment
of six border economic cooperation
zones, including one around the city
of Tengchong (see Map 1). This provincial initiative augmented the central
government’s approval of opening three
border economic cooperation zones
in the cities of Ruili, Wanding (under
the jurisdiction of Ruili but not controlled by it), and Hekou (Map 1) in
1992. Ruili and Hekou became the
first and second largest border ports for
Yunnan’s total foreign trade. Myanmar
is Yunnan’s largest trading partner,
and Ruili accounts for more than 30%
of the trade with Myanmar and more
than 60% of the province's trade with
Myanmar.6
To complement the spatial planning
of new city-regions and lively border
trade, Yunnan has created new institutional and cultural ties to the GMS countries. It has recently set up commercial
representative offices in Singapore and
Cambodia and is planning to expand
the number of Confucius Institutes and
Chinese language centers already operating in the GMS countries to increase
China’s soft power. It has trained a
growing number of specialists who can
speak Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese.
The number of international students in
Yunnan rose from 760 in 2001 to 10,000
in 2007 and to over 20,000 in 2011, with
about 80% of them having come primarily from Southeast Asia.7
The Myanmar border towns of
Muse and Namhkam have done well by
importing Chinese goods such as garments and consumer electronics, which

Map 1. Yunnan Province and Its City Circles and
Border Economic Zones
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occupy as much as 80-90% of the local markets in northern
Myanmar. In Lashio, a remote but important market town
195 kilometres from Mandalay in northern Shan State, many
trucks loaded with Chinese consumer goods rolled through
the town and onto the booming city of Mandalay. The population of Lashio is about 50% Chinese, while Mandalay, the
seat of Myanmar’s culture, is one-fifth Yunnanese Chinese.
This Chinese ‘on the ground’ influence helps pave the way for
China’s (and also Yunnan’s) new ambitious outlook for accessing the Indian Ocean over the Lashio--Mandalay land route.
Back to Yunnan’s border city of Ruili, which has a highly
mobile migrant population, the China-Myanmar nexus goes
both ways, with Myanmar’s local presence becoming stronger.
According to official statistics, an estimated 30,000 Myanmar
people either come through the border daily or take up longterm presence in Ruili. This is roughly equivalent to 17% of
the city’s total population of 180,627 in 2012, but this estimated figure only includes those who legally cross the porous
and at times seemingly nonexistent border. On a recent day,
we talked with two young Myanmese women from Muse
working in two different bookstores in Ruili. Both of them
are of Chinese descent, and both are happy to commute every
day across one of the three checkpoints to work in China.
At the same time, many from Myanmar have become more
settled residents in Ruili and formed a distinctive local community, with its own grocery stores, coffee shops, hair salons,
and long-distance telephone service. Most of the Myanmese
men we spoke to are engaged in the jade trade. China even
provides electricity and mobile phone service to Muse, allowing the Myanmese in Ruili to phone their family and relatives
in Muse as local calls.

Connecting and Powering for Development
To facilitate and scale up trade along and beyond China’s
combined long border with Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam,
China has been extending its tentacles of transport infrastructure to the GMS in multiple directions (see Map 2 on
next page). China has reached an agreement with Myanmar
to construct a rail link between Myanmar's Chinese border
and its western coast. The railroad will run from the Shan
State’s border town of Muse and span 800 kilometres across
the country to Rakhine State's port city of Kyaukphyu on
the Bay of Bengal. The whole project is projected to take
five years and is estimated to cost about $20 billion, and
it will be borne by China based on BOT (build, operate,
and transfer) for 50 years. Once completed, the railroad will
allow electric trains to travel at speeds of up to 200 kilometres per hour and carry 4,000 tons of goods. Strategically,
this railroad will carry China’s imports and exports to and
from the port of Kyaukphyu on the Indian Ocean via Ruili
and Kunming, obviating the need for ships to sail through
the narrow Malacca Strait.8
Pushed by China, the Lao government has recently
approved China’s offer to build a cross-border railroad to
connect the capital Vientiane to Luang Namtha Province
along the border with China, with a further extension to
Kunming and a total length of 420 kilometres. The ChinaVientiane railroad project, which is scheduled to be completed
by 2018, will require the construction of 76 tunnels and 154
bridges. The projected cost will be over $7 billion. China has
offered to extend a massive loan of $7.2 billion through its
Import-Export Bank to Laos. Originally agreed upon as a
China-Laos joint venture, the railroad ran into opposition for
requiring Laos to hand over vast tracts of land to the Chinese
contractor. The project is now going to be wholly owned by
the Lao government. Being landlocked, Laos is willing to
make major concessions to its powerful neighbor in the north
in an effort to turn itself into a country that is ‘land-linked’
with railroads.

To facilitate and scale up trade along and
beyond China’s combined long border with
Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, China has
been extending its tentacles of transport.
China has also intensified its varied efforts to secure
the rich natural resources in the region. It has stirred controversy in generating more hydropower by building a
number of dams on the Lancang River in Yunnan, which
forms the upper reaches of the Mekong River (see Map 2
on next page). Of the four dams already in operation and
the Nuozhadu Dam to be completed in 2014, the Xiaowan
and Nuozhadu dams, with 9,800 and 12,400 million cubic
metres of active storage, can redistribute a significant
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China has also intensified its varied efforts to secure the rich natural resources in the region.
It has stirred controversy in generating more hydropower by building a number of dams on
the Lancang River in Yunnan, which forms the upper reaches of the Mekong River.
amount of water from the wet to the dry season and reduce
sediment transport in the Mekong mainstream.9 The redistribution of water can help balance the water levels between
Mekong’s segments located in different countries. But the
dams on the upper Mekong could damage the migratory
fish stocks, which provide 40-80% of animal protein in
local diets to the approximately 70 million people living
within its watershed.10
China is actually not alone in damming the Mekong. Laos
stands out among the other GMS countries in maximising
its abundant water resources from the Mekong to speed up
development by selling hydropower to Thailand and China,
which controls 32% of Laos’ hydropower projects. However,
the huge environmental impact of such projects has worried
Laos and pressured it to suspend its most controversial proposal to build the $3.8-billion Xayaburi Dam (Map 2). The
GMS countries will continue to face the challenge in reconciling their competing development goals and interests bound
together by a long international river.

A Region on the Move
As China’s economic reach grows spatially through the GMS,
it has also begun to stretch its sphere of political influence.
After losing a dozen sailors on a freight boat plying the Mekong
River, China pushed Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos to help
hunt down a notorious drug lord who had been alleged to be
the mastermind behind the Mekong massacre. China worked
closely with Myanmar and Lao police to capture Naw Kham,
a Myanmar citizen, in northern Laos, and then extradited him
to China where he was paraded live on television and then executed by lethal injection in March 2013.11 The China-Myanmar
oil and gas pipeline, which starts at Kyaukpyu port on the west
coast of Myanmar and enters China at the city of Ruili, has
run into some resistance by local farmers in northern Myanmar
living near its route, and the concerns of an increasingly skeptical Myanmese public wary of China's growing dominance
were further heightened at the end of July when the natural
gas pipeline started to deliver gas to China, but it is expected to
be complete and fully operational later this year. This project is

Map 2. The Growing Transport Network (China-Myanmar gas-oil pipeline) and Dams in the Greater Mekong Subregion
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designed to transport 22 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion
cubic meters of gas per year from Myanmar’s west coast to
Kunming for processing by a new large refinery. This in turn
will provide much needed energy for China’s southwestern
development that will spread even more across the borders.
Some recent developments south of Yunnan may counter
or offset China’s influence as Southeast Asia itself also continues to integrate. The ADB has provided a total of $220 million
to strengthen small cities in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam
along the East-West Economic Corridor, allowing female street
vendors in three small cities to have access to a micro-finance
project worth $2.5 million in non-refundable aid from the Japan
Fund for Poverty Reduction. Higher labor and land costs in
China than in Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and even Vietnam
have already driven some of the most labor-intensive industries
(i.e. shoes and garments) to Southeast Asia. In 2012, Cambodia
received more foreign investment per person than China for
the first time since the 1970s.12 Laos has built the Savan-Seno
Special Economic Zone in Savannakhet City to attract more
labor-intensive manufacturing by connecting Thailand to China
and Thailand to Vietnam, trying to catch up to and learn from
China’s experience and trajectory of development.

It is up to all six member countries of the
GMS to determine how both regions can
compete and yet cooperate to achieve
greater sustainable development.
The GMS countries will continue to perform well, with
or without China’s investment, due to extensive economic
and spatial ties as well as cultural ties with its northern
neighbor. It is up to all six member countries of the GMS
and not just China to determine how both regions can
compete and yet cooperate to achieve greater sustainable
development. If a healthy relationship between China and
the GMS can be not just maintained, but deepened, the
economic and political landscape of the Mekong Region
will be forever reshaped.
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